The Art of Passing the Buck offers a simple, comprehensive explanation of how Wills and Trusts work. It reveals wealth retention, management and. LEGAL NOTICE. This is to inform you there is no authorized distributor or distribution for The Art of Passing the Buck, Vol. II: Trust Blueprints in either PDF or. The Art of Passing the Buck offers a simple, comprehensive explanation of how Wills and Trusts work. It reveals wealth retention, management.
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entitled The Art of Passing the Buck, which contains false statements about the internal revenue laws. Wycoff and Ozak advise customers to. kaz-news.info: The Art of Passing the Buck, Vol 2 () and a great selection of similar New, Used and Collectible Books available now at great. Synopsis. The Art of Passing the Buck offers a simple, comprehensive explanation of how Wills and Trusts work. It reveals wealth retention, management and.
When combined with a forest of jargon, complex financial issues and the possibility that lawyers and CPAs are themselves usually not taught certain key concepts, the subject rapidly becomes overwhelming. According to CPAs with whom we have spoken, the subject of Trusts is not taught in any complete form, and the IRS volunteers nothing about the subject.
You might be disturbed to learn that it is common that most lawyers and CPAs have not been properly educated in the basics of Trusts. This is because there has been a concentrated effort to narrow the field of legal instruction and to control the courts. The book, Justice for Sale , documents a multifaceted, comprehensive, and integrated campaign set in motion by large corporations to create taxpayer-subsidized law firms to In the late s law schools set about the process of downgrading courses in the law of trusts from required to elective status, so that while almost all the law books have made courses on state regulation mandatory, only a few continue to afford the law of trusts the status it enjoyed at the turn of the century.
In most law schools trust law is now an afterthought, buried somewhere in the elective course on estate planning. Unfortunately, when I first recommended to our curriculum committee that we add a course on this subject, there was simply no classroom text available. Because Trust literature is seldom published, it is virtually impossible to go to any single source to get reliable information about benefits of every Trust.
Further, available information on Trusts has been complicated to the point that the average person has almost no chance of understanding even the basic principles.
The information is out there, though, if you know where to look. The basic principles of Trusts and their management are simple, and proper administration of a Trust is no more difficult, and often easier, than running your basic small business. What the various kinds of both Statutory and Common-Law Trusts can and cannot do for you and yours;. What you should know about the Irrevocable Common-Law Trust that offers, among all the Trust types, the best combination of asset protection, for.
Once you have a picture of a sophisticated and complete Trust, you can more easily discover what other Trust type suits your needs, or whether the Trust from which you receive benefits properly handles administration. Whether or not you use the information contained here, we are certain that reading The Art of Passing the Buck will better prepare you and yours to deal with the emotionally charged matter of preparing for your passing.
This alone pays big dividends by giving you clarity about your choices and in reduced personal and family stress. To see why ignorance is not bliss when it comes to inheritance, please read and carefully consider the following item:. The new wife inherited the estate.
Since the Declaration of Trust restricted her use of neither Trust principal nor income, she was able to do as she chose. When she was finally, expensively, forced into court by the original Beneficiaries and made to produce the Trust documents, they found she had been given carte blanche with all funds, named her relatives as new Beneficiaries, and planned to pay the original Beneficiaries a pittance The column writer advises that this could have been avoided if the husband named both his wife and a Cotrustee to the estate.
This would restrain her actions as she needed the Cotrustee to cooperate before she could use funds. The bottom line in the article, written to the ex-wife, the mother of the children suing the estate, is expressed clearly in these two sentences,.
Because the Grantor is no longer alive to change his or her mind, and what is written in the Declaration of Trust, from now on referred to as Trust Indenture or Indenture, is cast in stone. In reviewing some Revocable Living Trusts, we discovered they are weak, lack direction, and in general, the Trust Grantor casually assigns funds after his or her death. We suggest that even a Revocable Living Trust, in which it states the Trust Grantor is the primary focus of the receipt of funds until his or her death, be written from the view of irrevocability.
There is also another choice: When you pass on, the assets are then placed into this newly created Irrevocable Trust. It is administered by a Board of Trustees or only one Trustee—preferably not a family member—whose job it is to take care of all the Beneficiaries. Refer to Figures 1 and 2. A Trust is a collection of assets transferred into financial accounts under the name of a Family Trust. For example, the name of the Trust might be the Smith Family Trust.
These assets, now identified as belonging to the Smith Family Trust, are managed for the benefit of Smith family members or other appointed people and groups. All recipients of goods or funds are identified as Beneficiaries. They receive the benefits of the Trust which may be assets kept or cash flow generated. The relationships of the Beneficiaries to the Trust and how these benefits are given to them control what type of Trust is set up.
The collection of transferred assets, identified as corpus, can be investments, rental property, promissory notes, business ventures, etc. Some Trusts pay most of funds at the death of the Grantor s , from now on referred to as Grantor, and some Trusts provide a cash flow to Beneficiaries during the lifetime of the Grantor. The Grantor does not have to die to benefit his or her family. There are two types of Trust—Revocable and Irrevocable.
The Living Trust is the most common Revocable Trust type. This means you can revoke the Trust at any time. A Revocable Trust, though, eventually becomes Irrevocable. This means the person who set up the Trust passed and can no longer change the terms of the Trust, thus making it irrevocable. Please refer to the following two Figures to see how funds flow through these two types of Trusts.
If you would rather not deal with these details, you may turn to Chapter 3 at any time to read about the benefits derived from being born into a Trust environment. The person s , such as the husband and wife, who sets up the Trust has assets to establish the initial corpus.
The Art of Passing the Buck, Vol 2
This is how the Trust is funded. He or she transfers title to the Trust. In this diagram— Figure 1, the Family Trust is set up. The name of this Family Trust can be the last name of your great-grandmother, or it can be your name. By creating a contract known as a Trust Indenture also known as a Declaration of Trust , a Trust is established. The Grantor as the Trustee sets forth the rules and regulations under which he or she agrees to manage funds for the Beneficiaries.
In a Revocable Trust, the immediate Beneficiary is usually the Grantor and spouse, after which are what is known as the Contingent Beneficiaries. These are those people who receive funds after the Grantor passes. During the life of the Revocable Trust the Grantor can give gifts to the Contingent Beneficiaries, but most of the inheritance remains under the control of the Grantors—usually the parents.
Acting as the Trustee, the Grantor Trust financial accounts by opening them in the name of the Family Trust. For funds to pass without going through probate, the Grantor adds the name of the successor Trustee to these bank accounts, so when the Grantor passes on, the successor Trustee becomes the Trustee with signature power on the Trust accounts.
If this step is not taken, then the Revocable Trust may need to go through probate to allow the bank to recognize the signature of the successor Trustee. The Grantor can establish an Irrevocable Trust at any time during his or her life. Once he or she places funds into the Trust, that person no longer owns them. The funds are the responsibility of the Trustees in the name of the Trust, and the Grantor is neither responsible for them, nor pays taxes on any increase.
The Beneficiaries are now eligible for distribution and pay taxes on what they receive. They do not need to wait until the Grantor passes. They can also take part in the financial decisions of the Trust if the Trustees invite them to do so, and they interact with the Trustees chosen to ensure their welfare.
The role of the Grantor and his or her relationship to the Beneficiaries changes. Without direct financial control over the Trust assets, the Grantor can remain as an advisor to the Board of Trustees, if he or she so chooses. The Grantor can keep control over the distribution throughout his or her lifetime.
We will go more into detail about that later in this book. With funds in the Trust, the Trustees invest and manage any income earned. They can sell the initial corpus and download different assets, or they can administer the original assets.
Because the purpose of the Trust is to increase assets and especially the cash flow, the Trustees receive a percentage of distribution as an incentive. It is likely that an aggressive Board of Trustees or just one Trustee , will take action to find strong, profitable investments that have a reasonable margin of safety.
The objective is to ensure the welfare of the Beneficiaries, and so profits produced from investments the Trust holds are either reinvested or the Beneficiaries receive some or all the profits.
The Grantor puts his or her assets into the Trust, and either the Grantor acting as Trustee, or the Trustees then invest the funds. When there is a payout of the investments, the funds go directly into the Trust bank account, where they are distributed to the Beneficiaries.
In a Revocable Trust, the Beneficiary ies is the Grantor. In both cases, a percentage of the profits can be reinvested. The following section about Divided Title and the U. Constitution is for those of you who want to explore the subject of Trust mechanics and definitions more deeply. For those who feel you are not ready for more details about the mechanics of inheritance, and would like to move onto a more friendly presentation, please go to Chapter 3.
In Chapter 3 we discuss what life might be like if you were a member of a strong Trust Group, which offered both financial security and ample mentoring. The support described mostly applies to an Irrevocable Private Trust where Trustees may personally interact with and be attentive to the Beneficiaries.
Here you will discover why those with enough funds are more likely to be successful. When you feel more comfortable with the ideas of inheritance, we invite you to return to this chapter to read this key additional information.
The fundamental feature of any Trust is the division of full title complete ownership of a particular property into legal title technical ownership and equitable title the beneficial right to possess and use the particular property. Trustees retain legal title to the property within the Trust and are responsible for administering and enforcing all Trust rules. The United States Constitution declares, no State shall In other words, by voluntarily and honestly contracting with your Trustee, you establish a lawful Trust.
No State can then impair or void the obligation you created. Therefore, Trust rules stand superior not only to state constitutional law; they form private law which operates legally outside the U.
Constitution—as guaranteed by that document itself. This does not give you any guarantees, though. Your Trust can still be challenged whether or not it is set up correctly. You might wonder why this is so important? Consider the ownership of residential property. Once put in Trust, several people have a vested interest. Seizure of the property by the government becomes a greater consideration because it is unknown how many of the Beneficiaries will contest the matter, and how much money is behind the Trust veil.
This idea of having the property seized by government authorities is not so uncommon. In fact, Eminent-domain abuse is widespread. Many people think that a Trust is a group of stocks, bonds and other investments held by a Trustee to produce money for Beneficiaries. This would be the most minimal of definitions. Others believe the rich use Trust to evade taxes, and people spend years searching for the tax loopholes. Granted, there are enormous tax advantages to a properly formed and managed Irrevocable Trust, but tax breaks are only a small part of the picture.
The legal and IRS definitions limit the scope and purpose of Trusts and so do not adequately or properly describe them. No wonder people have misconceptions! A good working definition for our purposes here would be: Passthrough accounting means the proceeds profits, earnings, etc. The business is granted or settled by a Trustor, Donor, Grantor or Settlor.
Its purpose is to acquire, hold and increase assets for its Beneficiaries. It is administered by a Trustee or a Board of Trustees. Within this business may be many other businesses run by managers who work for it, or it may hold and manage the stock of other businesses to help them all prosper and produce income.
Since the Trust is a business, it has its own income flow. Suppose we accept this and accept also that the experiences in question are intrinsically good. In saying this, we are barring the complication to be discussed in Section 5 taking the value of the experiences to be nonderivative. Nonetheless, we may well take this value, like all value, to be supervenient on, or grounded in, something.
In this case, we would probably simply attribute the value of the experiences to their having the feature of being pleasant.
This brings out the subtle but important point that the question whether some value is derivative is distinct from the question whether it is supervenient. Even nonderivative value value that something has in its own right; value that is, in some way, not attributable to the value of anything else is usually understood to be supervenient on certain nonevaluative features of the thing that has value and thus to be attributable, in a different way, to these features.
To repeat: whatever is intrinsically good is barring the complication to be discussed in Section 5 nonderivatively good. It would be a mistake, however, to affirm the converse of this and say that whatever is nonderivatively good is intrinsically good.
For example, suppose that your interlocutor were to ask you whether it is good to eat and drink in moderation and to exercise regularly. In what way, though?
Well, perhaps you would be thinking of health as intrinsically good. But perhaps not. If John were a villain, you might well deny this.
Indeed, you might want to insist that, in light of his villainy, his being healthy is intrinsically bad, even though you recognize that his being healthy is good for him. If you did say this, you would be indicating that you subscribe to the common view that intrinsic value is nonderivative value of some peculiarly moral sort. One of the first writers to concern himself with the question of what exactly is at issue when we ascribe intrinsic value to something was G.
Moore [—]. In his book Principia Ethica, Moore asks whether the concept of intrinsic value or, more particularly, the concept of intrinsic goodness, upon which he tended to focus is analyzable. One example of an analysis of this sort is the analysis of the concept of being a vixen in terms of the concepts of being a fox and being female.
His own answer to the question is that the concept of intrinsic goodness is not amenable to such analysis Moore , ch. In place of analysis, Moore proposes a certain kind of thought-experiment in order both to come to understand the concept better and to reach a decision about what is intrinsically good. For example, if such a thought-experiment led you to conclude that all and only pleasure would be good in isolation, and all and only pain bad, you would be a hedonist.
He says that it involves our saying that a world in which only pleasure existed—a world without any knowledge, love, enjoyment of beauty, or moral qualities—is better than a world that contained all these things but in which there existed slightly less pleasure Moore , p.
Such a view he finds absurd. Regardless of the merits of this isolation test, it remains unclear exactly why Moore finds the concept of intrinsic goodness to be unanalyzable. One candidate that Moore discusses is this: for something to be intrinsically good is for it to be something that we desire to desire. He argues that any such analysis is to be rejected, since it will always be intelligible to ask whether and, presumably, to deny that it is good that something be A, B, C,…, which would not be the case if the analysis were accurate Moore , pp.
Moore apparently thinks that his objection works just as well where one or more of the component concepts A, B, C,…, is evaluative; but, again, many dispute the cogency of his argument. Indeed, several philosophers have proposed analyses of just this sort.
Inheritance Scam by Charles Arthur
He formulates a view according to which to put matters roughly to say that a state of affairs is intrinsically good or bad is to say that it is possible that its goodness or badness constitutes all the goodness or badness that there is in the world Chisholm However, the general idea that an intrinsically valuable state is one that could somehow account for all the value in the world is suggestive and promising; if it could be adequately formulated, it would reveal an important feature of intrinsic value that would help us better understand the concept.
We will return to this point in Section 5. Rather than pursue such a line of thought, Chisholm himself responded Chisholm in a different way to Bodanszky and Conee.
This new analysis in fact reflects a general idea that has a rich history. Franz Brentano [—], C. Broad [—], W. Ross [—], and A. It would thus seem very natural to suppose that for something to be intrinsically good is simply for it to be such that it is fitting to value it for its own sake. The underlying point is that those who value for its own sake that which is intrinsically good thereby evince a kind of moral sensitivity.
Though undoubtedly attractive, this analysis can be and has been challenged. Brand Blanshard [—], for example, argues that the analysis is to be rejected because, if we ask why something is such that it is fitting to value it for its own sake, the answer is that this is the case precisely because the thing in question is intrinsically good; this answer indicates that the concept of intrinsic goodness is more fundamental than that of the fittingness of some pro attitude, which is inconsistent with analyzing the former in terms of the latter Blanshard , pp.
Lemos , p. Whether such an account is acceptable has recently been the subject of intense debate. Many, like Scanlon, endorse passing the buck; some, like Blanshard, object to doing so. Hence a buck-passer may, but need not, accept the analysis. Indeed, there is reason to think that Moore himself is a buck-passer, even though he takes the concept of intrinsic goodness to be unanalyzable; cf.
Olson If this were the case, it would reveal an important feature of intrinsic value, recognition of which would help us to improve our understanding of the concept.
However, this thesis has also been challenged. Krister Bykvist has argued that what he calls solitary goods may constitute a counterexample to part a of the thesis Bykvist , pp. Such alleged goods consist in states of affairs that entail that there is no one in a position to value them. Suppose, for example, that happiness is intrinsically good, and good in such a way that it is fitting to welcome it. Then, more particularly, the state of affairs of there being happy egrets is intrinsically good; so too, presumably, is the more complex state of affairs of there being happy egrets but no welcomers.
The simpler state of affairs would appear to pose no problem for part a of the thesis, but the more complex state of affairs, which is an example of a solitary good, may pose a problem. For if to welcome a state of affairs entails that that state of affairs obtains, then welcoming the more complex state of affairs is logically impossible. Furthermore, if to welcome a state of affairs entails that one believes that that state of affairs obtains, then the pertinent belief regarding the more complex state of affairs would be necessarily false.
In neither case would it seem plausible to say that welcoming the state of affairs is nonetheless fitting. Thus, unless this challenge can somehow be met, a proponent of the thesis must restrict the thesis to pro attitudes that are neither truth- nor belief-entailing, a restriction that might itself prove unwelcome, since it excludes a number of favorable responses to what is good such as promoting what is good, or taking pleasure in what is good to which proponents of the thesis have often appealed.
As to part b of the thesis: some philosophers have argued that it can be fitting to value something for its own sake even if that thing is not intrinsically good.
A relatively early version of this argument was again provided by Blanshard , pp. Recently the issue has been brought into stark relief by the following sort of thought-experiment.
Imagine that an evil demon wants you to value him for his own sake and threatens to cause you severe suffering unless you do. Some have been persuaded that the challenge succeeds, while others have sought to undermine it. One final cautionary note. Nonetheless, it becomes clear on further inspection that Kant is in fact discussing a concept quite different from that with which this article is concerned.
Such talk indicates that Kant believes that the sort of value that he ascribes to rational beings is one that they possess to an infinite degree. But then, if this were understood as a thesis about intrinsic value as we have been understanding this concept, the implication would seem to be that, since it contains rational beings, ours is the best of all possible worlds. It seems best to understand Kant, and other philosophers who have since written in the same vein cf.
Bradley In the history of philosophy, relatively few seem to have entertained doubts about the concept of intrinsic value. Much of the debate about intrinsic value has tended to be about what things actually do have such value.
However, once questions about the concept itself were raised, doubts about its metaphysical implications, its moral significance, and even its very coherence began to appear. Consider, first, the metaphysics underlying ascriptions of intrinsic value.
It seems safe to say that, before the twentieth century, most moral philosophers presupposed that the intrinsic goodness of something is a genuine property of that thing, one that is no less real than the properties of being pleasant, of satisfying a need, or whatever in virtue of which the thing in question is good.
Several dissented from this view, however. See Hobbes , Hume Ayer [—] and Charles L. Stevenson [—] see Ayer , Stevenson Other philosophers have since embraced other forms of noncognitivism. But this seems to be a mistake. We should distinguish questions about value from questions about evaluation. Questions about value fall into two main groups, conceptual of the sort discussed in the last section and substantive of the sort discussed in the first section.
Questions about evaluation have to do with what precisely is going on when we ascribe value to something. Cognitivists claim that our ascriptions of value constitute statements that are either true or false; noncognitivists deny this.
But even noncognitivists must recognize that our ascriptions of value fall into two fundamental classes—ascriptions of intrinsic value and ascriptions of extrinsic value—and so they too must concern themselves with the very same conceptual and substantive questions about value as cognitivists address. It may be that noncognitivism dictates or rules out certain answers to these questions that cognitivism does not, but that is of course quite a different matter from rejecting the very idea of intrinsic value on metaphysical grounds.
According to the pragmatist, the world is constantly changing in such a way that the solution to one problem becomes the source of another, what is an end in one context is a means in another, and thus it is a mistake to seek or offer a timeless list of intrinsic goods and evils, of ends to be achieved or avoided for their own sakes. This theme has been elaborated by Monroe Beardsley, who attacks the very notion of intrinsic value Beardsley ; cf.
Conee Denying that the existence of something with extrinsic value presupposes the existence of something else with intrinsic value, Beardsley argues that all value is extrinsic. Far from repudiating the notion of intrinsic value, though, this admission would confirm its legitimacy.
But Beardsley would insist that this quick response misses the point of his attack, and that it really is the case, not just that whatever has value has extrinsic value, but also that nothing has intrinsic value. But here Beardsley seems to be overreaching.
Even if it were the case that we cannot know whether something has intrinsic value, this of course leaves open the question whether anything does have such value.
And even if it could somehow be shown that nothing does have such value, this would still leave open the question whether something could have such value. As has been noted, some philosophers do indeed doubt the legitimacy, the very coherence, of the concept of intrinsic value. Before we turn to a discussion of this issue, however, let us for the moment presume that the concept is coherent and address a different sort of doubt: the doubt that the concept has any great moral significance.
Recall the suggestion, mentioned in the last section, that discussions of intrinsic value may have been compromised by a failure to distinguish certain concepts. An example of a nonrelational property is the property of being round; an example of a relational property is the property of being loved. As an illustration of final value, Korsgaard suggests that gorgeously enameled frying pans are, in virtue of the role they play in our lives, good for their own sakes.
In like fashion, Beardsley wonders whether a rare stamp may be good for its own sake Beardsley ; Shelly Kagan says that the pen that Abraham Lincoln used to sign the Emancipation Proclamation may well be good for its own sake Kagan ; and others have offered similar examples cf.
Notice that in each case the value being attributed to the object in question is allegedly had in virtue of some extrinsic property of the object. There is an important corollary to drawing a distinction between intrinsic value and final value and between extrinsic value and nonfinal value , and that is that, contrary to what Korsgaard herself initially says, it may be a mistake to contrast final value with instrumental value.
If it is possible, as Korsgaard claims, that final value sometimes supervenes on extrinsic properties, then it might be possible that it sometimes supervenes in particular on the property of being a means to some other end. Kagan also tentatively endorses this idea. If the idea is coherent, then we should in principle distinguish two kinds of instrumental value, one final and the other nonfinal.
Even if it is agreed that it is final value that is central to the concerns of moral philosophers, we should be careful in drawing the conclusion that intrinsic value is not central to their concerns. Whether this is in fact the case depends in part on just what sort of thing can be valuable for its own sake—an issue to be taken up in the next section.
In light of the matter just discussed, we must now decide what terminology to adopt. Let us now turn to doubts about the very coherence of the concept of intrinsic value, so understood. In Principia Ethica and elsewhere, Moore embraces the consequentialist view, mentioned above, that whether an action is morally right or wrong turns exclusively on whether its consequences are intrinsically better than those of its alternatives.
Some philosophers have recently argued that ascribing intrinsic value to consequences in this way is fundamentally misconceived. Philippa Foot, among others, has made a similar charge Foot He maintains that, for Moore and other proponents of intrinsic value, such value is a particular kind of moral value.
Among those who do not doubt the coherence of the concept of intrinsic value there is considerable difference of opinion about what sort or sorts of entity can have such value. Moore does not explicitly address this issue, but his writings show him to have a liberal view on the matter.
There are times when he talks of individual objects e. To what kind s of entity do such terms refer? Various answers have been given. Some such as Panayot Butchvarov claim that it is properties that are the bearers of intrinsic value Butchvarov , pp.
Others such as Chisholm claim that it is states of affairs that are the bearers of intrinsic value Chisholm —69, , Still others such as Ross claim that it is facts that are the bearers of intrinsic value Ross , pp.
Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value
Lemos , ch. Ontologists often divide entities into two fundamental classes, those that are abstract and those that are concrete. Unfortunately, there is no consensus on just how this distinction is to be drawn. Most philosophers would classify the sorts of entities just mentioned properties, states of affairs, and facts as abstract. So understood, the claim that intrinsic value is borne by such entities is to be distinguished from the claim that it is borne by certain other closely related entities that are often classified as concrete.
For example, it has recently been suggested that it is tropes that have intrinsic value. Thus the particular whiteness of a particular piece of paper is to be distinguished, on this view, from the property of whiteness.
It has also been suggested that it is states, understood as a kind of instance of states of affairs, that have intrinsic value cf.
Zimmerman , ch. Those who make monistic proposals of the sort just mentioned are aware that intrinsic value is sometimes ascribed to kinds of entities different from those favored by their proposals.
They claim that all such ascriptions can be reduced to, or translated into, ascriptions of intrinsic value of the sort they deem proper. Ross would say that this cannot be the case. If there is any intrinsic value to be found here, it will, according to Ross, not reside in the pan itself but in the fact that it plays a certain role in our lives, or perhaps in the fact that something plays this role, or in the fact that something that plays this role exists.
Others would make other translations in the terms that they deem appropriate. On the basis of this ascription of intrinsic value to some fact, Ross could go on to ascribe a kind of extrinsic value to the pan itself, in virtue of its relation to the fact in question. Whether reduction of this sort is acceptable has been a matter of considerable debate.
Proponents of monism maintain that it introduces some much-needed order into the discussion of intrinsic value, clarifying just what is involved in the ascription of such value and simplifying the computation of such value—on which point, see the next section.
On this point, see the last section; Zimmerman , ch. Opponents argue that reduction results in distortion and oversimplification; they maintain that, even if there is intrinsic value to be found in such a fact as that a gorgeously enameled frying pan plays a certain role in our lives, there may yet be intrinsic, and not merely extrinsic, value to be found in the pan itself and perhaps also in its existence cf.
See again the cautionary note in the final paragraph of Section 2 above. In our assessments of intrinsic value, we are often and understandably concerned not only with whether something is good or bad but with how good or bad it is.
Arriving at an answer to the latter question is not straightforward. At least three problems threaten to undermine the computation of intrinsic value. First, there is the possibility that the relation of intrinsic betterness is not transitive that is, the possibility that something A is intrinsically better than something else B, which is itself intrinsically better than some third thing C, and yet A is not intrinsically better than C.
Despite the very natural assumption that this relation is transitive, it has been argued that it is not Rachels ; Temkin , , And because the poor are no longer fed, clothed, and sheltered at a personal sacrifice but at the expense of taxpayers Pagans say about Christians: "See how they pass the buck.
After you die, this puts all your assets into a Trust for your heirs, with instructions to Trustees about distribution and wealth management. These resources have been summarized and presented by those who deal in the Trust world, thus creating the broad database now available in The Art of Passing the Buck. Two questions arise.
How can you tell whether something has intrinsic value or not? Next Next post: